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Scotland’s Progressive Rhetoric: 
Devolution and Carer’s Allowance 
Abstract 
The Scotland Act 2016 devolved powers over eleven social security benefits (including Carer’s 
Allowance) providing Scotland with some, albeit limited, opportunity to differentiate itself in 
terms of welfare policy progressivity. The Carers (Scotland) Act 2016 set out the strategy for 
supporting those who limit their employment or educational enrolment due to the 
responsibility of caring for an adult or child with a health condition. Using a microsimulation of 
Scottish data from the Family Resource Survey, this paper explores the potential impact, on 
income and poverty rates of carer households, of raising the level of CA by various amounts 
and by changing the eligibility criteria. It concludes that while the Scottish Government’s 
ambitions are too modest to fully support their progressive rhetoric, or to change the overall 
income inequality landscape, the reforms in targeted policy do make a substantial difference 
to the lived experience to carers in poverty and, by extension, to the receipt of that care.  
Keywords: care; devolution; income; poverty; social security   
Introduction 
In the twenty years since the creation of the Scottish Parliament devolution has progressed in a 
piecemeal fashion (Mooney and Wright, 2009). Devolution offered the potential for different welfare 
settlements and institutional arrangements and the newly devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland from 1999 onwards began to develop policy in certain key areas, including 
health, social care and education policy. The potential for policy divergence from Westminster was 
“given greater impetus” with the election of a minority Scottish National Party-led Government in 
Edinburgh at the May 2007 Scottish elections. While Scotland voted against independence in 
September 2014, there are still strong pressures for Scottish social policy to continue to diverge from 
the rest of the UK (Law and Mooney, 2012). Scotland has long claimed to be ‘different’, and Scottish 
parties have prominently employed the rhetoric of social justice. However, fiscal policy has 
constrained the extent of divergence to date, as likely has political conservativism, with pro-
independence parties tending to continue to push for independence rather than fully using what 
powers they have to innovate (Rummery and McAngus, 2015). As such, Smith and Hellowell (2012) 
have argued that the divergence between Scotland and the rest of the UK has often been more 
rhetorical than evident in actual policy outcomes. 
Significant new powers have nevertheless gradually been bestowed on the devolved parliaments. 
Following the 2014 independence referendum, the Smith Commission was set up to deliver more 
financial, welfare and taxation powers to the Scottish Government. The Scotland Act 2016 gave 
Scottish Ministers for the first time powers over eleven benefits within the UK social security system, 
one of which was Carer’s Allowance (CA). The Carers (Scotland) Act 2016 set out the Scottish 
Government’s strategy for supporting, through financial support and recognition, those who give up or 
limit their employment or educational enrolment in order to provide care informally. Subsequently, 
The Social Security (Scotland) Act 2018 set a new framework for the new system. This devolution of 
certain benefits within the social security system, albeit limited, offers the opportunity for potential 
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progressive reform of social security policy. Proposals to increase CA aim to improve the lives of carers, 
many of whom are ‘significantly disadvantaged by caregiving’ (Larkin and Milne, 2014: 34), could go 
some way to redressing the historic undervaluing of care and care work (Cantillon and Lynch, 2017; 
Folbre, 2002).  
These developments sit within a larger political landscape with alternative visions for the future of 
social security in Scotland. As Simpson (2017: 254) argues, these have included both fairly specific and 
immediate reforms which depart from current UK policy and a longer-term vision for a radically 
overhauled welfare state. It is not certain that devolution will lead to major policy departures, but it 
does for the first time provide the opportunity for the Scottish Government to develop distinctive 
policies in some areas. Devolution has significant implications for how ‘the social rights of citizenship’ 
are secured in Scotland, i.e. the citizen’s right to a minimum standard of living, and obligations upon 
the state to ensure them (p252). Indeed, the ‘indy-ref’ as it colloquially became known was ‘a high-
profile manifestation of… questions of citizens’ welfare and disquiet with the welfare reform agenda 
featured prominently in secessionist rhetoric’ (p251). 
While the independence campaign centred upon broader issues, the ability to transform the social 
security system was ‘clearly signalled’ by the Scottish Government as a major part of their case for 
independence (Spicker, 2015: 20). In some areas such as health, social care, education and the legal 
system, Scotland already has devolved powers, but “the disputed terrain has moved… to issues related 
to the economy, taxation and income maintenance, all areas substantially reserved to the government 
of the UK” (p18). Lodge and Trench (2014) note that social policy has started to diverge across the 
nations of the UK. In Scotland unlike the rest of the UK, the Scottish Government already cover the 
cost of social care provision for those assessed as needing personal and nursing care, 
regardless of income, assets, or marital or civil partner status, although contribution is sought for 
those living in residential care homes (Scottish Government, 2018). Parry (2004: 173) calls this: “The 
most prominent example of a divergent policy in post-devolution Scotland.” Similarly, all NHS 
prescriptions are free in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland but not England. Yet, Rummery and 
McAngus (2015) challenge that while these initiatives have been “heralded as proof that Scotland 
envisages itself as providing more socially just policies for vulnerable groups than the rest of the 
UK...this rhetoric does not bear empirical scrutiny. They find little evidence “from its performance to 
date that an independent Scottish Parliament would embrace radical policies that would empower 
disabled people more effectively than the rest of the UK” (p 239).  
Commencing in Summer 2018, The Carers (Scotland) Act set out, amongst other things: a duty on local 
authorities to provide support to carers and plans to raise the level of CA as sitting ‘within the wider 
policy landscape including: integration of Health and Social Care; GP contract; new social security 
powers; and Fair Work agenda’ (Scottish Government, 2017a). At the centre of proposed reforms is a 
rise in CA, the main earnings-replacement benefit paid directly to people who provide substantial 
levels of care to a relative or friend with care and support needs caused by a physical or mental health 
condition, which is at present the lowest income-replacement benefit (SPICe, 2016). Many see CA as 
set far too low to sustain an acceptable or dignified standard of living (Carers UK, 2014). Other benefits 
such as Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA), the main means-tested benefit for people actively seeking work, 
has been worth around £10 a week more in the UK. The 2017-18 CA rate of £62.70 a week set by The 
UK Government (April 2017) similarly reflected a very small rise from the 2016-17 rate of £62.10 a 
week, in line with inflation (GOV.UK, 2017a). This modest increment, accompanied by a small rise in 
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the amount that can be earned while remaining eligible for CA, from £110 net to £116 a week, was 
portrayed as a significant reform by the then Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Damian Green, 
which celebrated carers and their contribution to society (ABLE, 2017). However, written responses to 
a consultation by the Scottish Government on the future of social security in Scotland (Scottish 
Parliament, 2017b) echoed concerns raised previously by the House of Commons Work and Pensions 
Committee (UK Parliament, 2008), recommending the radical overhaul of the benefit in recognition of 
carers’ contribution to society (SPIC, 2016: 17). It is estimated that unpaid care work is worth £10.8 
billion a year to the Scottish economy (£132 billion at UK level), which is close to the cost of the 
National Health Service annually (Buckner and Yeandle, 2015).  
An Expert Working Group on Welfare, established to advise the Scottish Government described the 
level of CA as an ‘unacceptable anomaly,’ recommending that the weekly rate be raised to the level of 
JSA for those aged 25 and over (SPICE, 2016: 20), £73.10 a week at the time of writing, equating to a 
rise of £10.40. Demonstrating the political will behind investment in carers in Scotland, the Scottish 
Government received a large and unambiguous response to their 2016 consultation of their proposed 
reforms (SPICE, 2016: 16). 89% of respondents, were highly in favour of the broad approach to 
developing a Scottish carer’s benefit, and an increase in the rate (Scottish Government, 2017b: 154). 
When in November of 2016, The Scottish Executive pledged to raise CA in line with JSA, with the aim of 
providing some support and recognition, it was estimated that it would give carers an additional £600 
a year (SPICE, 2016: 27). The main Scottish political parties all supported such an increase, although 
the Greens proposed a greater increase to £93.15 a week (The Scottish Green Party, 2016: 8). In 2018, 
the Scottish Government introduced a CA supplement as a mechanism for uprating CA in the form of 
two lump sum payments amounting to an increase of £452.40 a year (MYGOV.SCOT, 2019). This was 
intended to fulfil the obligation of uprating CA in line with JSA while the payment of CA is in transition 
between the Department of Work and Pensions and the Scottish Government, reflecting a rise of 13% 
in the CA.  
This article begins by critically reviewing the context of the care economy and notions of a care crisis 
which surrounds calls for greater recognition and support for unpaid care work. It then considers the 
question of who cares, and the conditions in which they do so, in order to better understand who 
would stand to benefit from any reforms of the CA. Following a brief discussion of methodology, 
microsimulation modelling is used to analyse the distributional impact of six potential reforms 
scenarios that the Scottish Government could adopt, including the increase in CA which took effect in 
the summer of 2018. Focusing only on Scottish households rather than for the UK as a whole allows a 
post devolution scrutiny of the impact of increasing the amount of CA; altering eligibility requirements 
on income inequality and poverty rates; and the numbers of CA households in poverty.  
The Political Economy of Care 
Care work and the ‘care economy’ are major topics of national and global policy concern (e.g. United 
Nations, 2015), with talk of a ‘care crisis’ relating to both the implications of aging populations 
alongside increasing female labour market participation and the concomitant retrenchment of welfare 
states. Buckner and Yeandle (2015) find that from 2001 to 2015 the UK saw the number of people, 
aged 85 and over, increase by over 431,000 (+38%). The number of people with a limiting long-term 
illness increased by 1.6 million (+16%). As the demand for paid care ‘already outstrips supply, reliance 
on contributions made by unpaid carers is likely to increase’ (Singleton and Fry, 2015: 552). Social care 
is also under increasing pressure. It is estimated that in five years’ time, 87% of local authorities will 
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not have the capacity to provide adequate care homes places required for the elderly (Which?, 2017). 
Austerity measures introduced since 2010 have created an increasingly challenging context for local 
authorities responsible for commissioning homecare and other forms of supports for care in the 
community. Without major investment in social care, much care work will have to be provided 
informally. The number of hours of care being provided informally is increasing so that the cost saving 
to the public purse in the UK has almost doubled its value between 2001-15, providing an estimated 
weekly value of £2.5 billion (Buckner and Yeandle, 2015: 5).  
There are strong reasons to argue that certain aspects of care are non-commodifiable. Often care is 
best provided ‘informally’ by loved ones, rather than as part of formal care provision i.e. waged work 
undertaken by someone not in a pre-existing relationship with the care recipient (Cantillon and 
Lynch,2017). Indeed, because of this feature, ‘the true value of the care and support provided by 
unpaid carers cannot be quantified, as caring is also an expression of love and respect for another 
person’ (Buckner and Yeandle, 2015: 8). However, ‘informal’ may also mean unpaid, underpaid or 
otherwise poorly supported by the state if the carer does not meet certain criteria, such as a stipulated 
number of hours per week, or if the care giver is in full-time education or crosses a low weekly 
earnings threshold. Arguably, even where these criteria are met, existing financial support is woefully 
inadequate to support a reasonable standard of living for those whose main activity is the care of 
others (Carers UK, 2014). 
Undervaluing care 
Feminist writers have long argued that care work, in all its forms is hugely undervalued as it is treated 
as ‘women’s work’ (Cantillon and Lynch, 2017; Folbre, 2002). Care work remains deeply gendered, 
with women predominantly providing care broadly conceived, and being more likely to be at the 
‘heavy end’ of caring (Lloyd, 2006: 947). The demands for provision of care can also be very time 
specific so that women at particular stages of the life cycle are often simultaneously providing care 
upwards to elderly relatives and downwards to young children – the so called ‘sandwich generation’ 
(Miller, 1981; Brody, 1990; Nichols and Junk, 1997; Grundy and Henretta, 2006). Although there are 
vocal advocacy groups (Carers UK, Carers Scotland), carers have not historically been a powerful 
group politically (Larkin and Milne, 2014). As one respondent carer told the Scottish Government 
consultation on CA, ‘[w]e are a hidden asset, largely ignored and [we] deserve so much more’ 
(Scottish Government, 2017b: 155). Incrementally, carers have become increasingly prominent 
politically. The work of organisations like Carers UK have lobbied government, drawing attention to 
the important role of carers and the struggles they face (Larkin and Milne, 2014; Lloyd, 2006). 
Campaigning and lobbying government has encouraged understandings of what Singleton and Fry 
(2015: 550) term the ‘acknowledgment/recognition function’ of transfers such as CA which may act 
as ‘a crucial bulwark against the way carers’ contribution to society can be rendered “invisible” in 
public discourse.’  
A carer’s benefit was instituted in 1976, but is only now approaching a level of parity with benefits 
provided to people unemployed but actively seeking work (Carers UK, 2014: 81-2). Society, and 
indeed the state, currently relies upon undervalued and under-supported informal care to prop up an 
increasingly austere yet in-demand social security system: “The government needs carers to be 
heroic and self-sacrificing. The slogan that they merit more services because they save the country 
money is self-defeating” (Lloyd, 2006: 952). 
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Research sponsored by Carers UK finds that many carers are near breaking point, lacking ‘sufficient 
and affordable care services to back families up and enable them to have a life of their own alongside 
caring’ (Buckner and Yeandle, 2015: 15). The 2019 State of Caring Report details the huge personal and 
financial cost of caring unpaid for a loved one. On top of providing tens of hours of care every week for 
family members or friends, more than two thirds (68%) of carers are using their own income or savings 
to cover the cost of care, equipment or products for the person they care for. As a result, many are 
struggling financially and are unable to save for their own retirement. Two in five carers (39%) say they 
are struggling to make ends meet and more than half (53%) of all carers are unable to save for 
retirement (Carers UK, 2019). 
Who cares in Scotland?   
Official estimates1 suggest that there are 759,000 adult carers (aged 16 or over) in Scotland and a 
further 29,000 carers under the age of 16 (SPICe, 2016: 24), equating to approximately 788,000 unpaid 
carers. Such estimates are likely to underestimate the number providing lower-levels of care who may 
not define themselves as ‘carers’. Figures from the Department for Work and Pensions record 116,081 
unpaid Scottish carers as entitled to CA2, while only 71,585 people currently receive the benefit. It is 
thought that many providing informal care fall foul of ‘overlapping benefits’ rules under which a 
person may have an ‘underlying entitlement’ to CA but cannot receive more than one income-
replacement benefit at a time, which mostly affects pensioners (SPICe, 2016: 3). Of 36,850 people 
aged 65 and over who have an entitlement to CA only 960 are receiving the benefit (SPICe, 2016: 27).  
Eligibility criteria  
While CA is a non-means tested benefit, to be eligible, individuals must currently meet several criteria. 
Firstly, the care-recipient must be in receipt of certain benefits, relating to a defined disability, physical 
or mental health issues, substance misuse or frailty, which may require life-long care, or relate to 
substantive care for shorter periods of time (SPICe, 2016: 16-17). Secondly, the care-giver must: spend 
at least 35 hours a week caring for another person, must not be in full-time education and cannot earn 
more than £116 a week after tax and certain expenses (GOV.UK, 2017). Carers under 16 are not 
currently eligible. According to Scotland’s most recent census, there were 1328 people aged 15 and 
under who provide more than 35 hours of unpaid care per week. However, in May 2016, the Scottish 
Government announced that they would look at the possibility of introducing a Young Carer’s 
Allowance, as well as removing restrictions on employment and studying while retaining the 
requirement to provide ‘regular and substantial’ care at 35 hours per week (SPICe, 2016: 24-5). 
Subsequently, Scottish Government have announced that a Young Carer Grant will be paid from 
Autumn 2019 for those not eligible for CA who care for more than 16 hours per week (GOV.SCOT, 
2017). The grant will amount to a £300 annual payment as well as concessionary bus travel.  
In terms of the extent of divergence from UK policy, The UK Parliament Work and Pensions Committee 
had questioned the eligibility criteria, for example, criticising the earnings limit for making it near 
impossible for carers to combine paid work with caring responsibilities as carers lose their entitlement 
to CA if they earn even pennies above the specified limit (UK Parliament, 2008: 46-8). Initially the 
                                                          
1
 Based on the most recent Scottish Census (2011) and the Scottish Health Survey (SHS) for 2012/13 (see 
SPICe, 2016: 28). 
2
 As at August 2017, based on DWP statistics accessed via Stat-Xplore online: https://stat-
xplore.dwp.gov.uk/webapi/jsf/login.xhtml [20.4.18]  
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Scotland Bill 2015 had stipulated that recipients could not be ‘gainfully employed’. However, the 
Devolution (Further Powers) Committee saw this definition as overly restrictive and furthermore, 
would leave entitlement overly sensitive to adjustments in the National Minimum Wage, i.e. small 
increases in the wage floor might push carers who combined care with low-paid work, over the 
earnings threshold and lose their entitlement to CA (Scottish Women’s Convention, 2016: 5). CA had 
been defined as falling within the benefits cap of between £13,400 and £20,000 (outside of London) 
depending on household circumstances (GOV.UK, 2017b). However, the UK Government has since 
announced that CA will no longer be subject to the benefit cap, following a High Court ruling which 
deemed that Government was unlawfully discriminating against disabled people and their carers 
(SPICe, 2016: 24). 
There are considerable fiscal restraints upon Scottish plans to overhaul the social security system. At 
present, the UK Government provides the Scottish Government with a block grant. The amount of the 
grant is determined by the Barnett Formula, the mechanism used by the UK Treasury to adjust the 
amounts of funding allocated to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, applying to around 85% of the 
Scottish Parliament's total budget (SPICe, 2016:14-15). Any increases in benefits or new awards that 
take them beyond this fixed pot must be funded by the Scottish Government itself (SPICe, 2016: 16). 
There are furthermore several other ways in which CA interacts with other benefits which requires 
consideration in any reform proposal, such as changes from disability living allowance to personal 
independence payments, and the treatment of CA as income that is taken into account for other 
means-tested benefits (SPICe, 2016: 18). The microsimulation presented below consequently examines 
scenarios where a corresponding increase in carer premiums for income support is included, alongside 
the increase in CA, to make sure that low income carers get the full benefit of the CA increase. 
Likewise, a scenario involving a corresponding increase in the Employment and Support allowance and 
housing benefit alongside various proposed increases in CA because many low-income households 
who claim CA may also claim these benefits are also examined.  
Projected costs of reform scenarios 
Existing government and policy research has focused upon the likely costs of raising CA by various 
amounts and of relaxing eligibility requirements (e.g. SPICe, 2016, The Scottish Government, 2017b).  
However, this has not extended to looking at the impact of proposed reform scenarios on the poverty 
rate among carer’s households. The Scottish Parliament Information Centre (SPICe, 2016: 29) has 
modelled different scenarios for potential expenditure based on the new rate proposed for CA in line 
with JSA (£73.10 a week). The cost projections of changing the eligibility requirements and thus caseload 
have much larger costs implications than simply increasing the rate in line with JSA e.g. £38 m vs £656m 
if all limitations were removed. But what of the targeted impacts of these changes on the incomes and 
poverty rates of carer households? 
Increases to Carer’s Allowance:  A Microsimulation Model  
In order to tease out the impact of changes to CA a microsimulation model analysis was 
undertaken3.  The survey data used are drawn from a pooling together of the Family Resources 
Survey (FRS) for the years 2012-13, 2013-14 and 2014-15. The results shown are for Scottish 
                                                          
3
 Microsimulation modelling conducted by Howard Reed/Landman Economics http://www.landman-
economics.co.uk 
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households only rather than for the UK as a whole. The survey sample is a total of 8,953 households 
of which 161 (1.8 per cent) contain a CA claimant. The results use the weighting factors in the FRS to 
reweight the data so that they are more representative of the original population. 
Tables 1 to 6 below present the results of the application of six potential reform scenarios that the 
Scottish Government might consider in terms of changes to the CA. The Scottish Government in the 
Carers (Scotland) Act 2016 already committed to increasing the CA in line with JSA (£73.10), an 
increase of £10.40 per week. However, since the single adult JSA has been frozen from 2016-2020 and 
moreover the JSA payment itself falls short- at around 54%- of the governments poverty line for single 
adults- without housing costs- and comes in at only 36% of the ‘Minimum Income standard’ as 
estimated by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation.4 For these reasons the first reform scenario proposed 
is an increase of £20 a week which is £9.60 a week above what the Scottish Government have already 
committed. The second proposed increase in CA of £40 a week is a little higher than the proposal 
made by the Scottish Green Party. Their proposal is to increase CA to £94 a week which is a £30.30 
increase on current rate (The Scottish Green Party, 2016: 8). In pushing the boat out a little further 
than either the Scottish Government or the Scottish Green party proposed increases in CA, we try to 
examine the extent to which even limited devolution can allow some progressive redistribution. The 
Scottish Government’s consultations with stakeholders raised concerns about the eligibility criteria 
around CA, in addition to its level, and we examine widening eligibility to include pensioners with 
significant caring duties (Scottish Women’s Convention, 2016).  
Specifically, the following separate reforms are modelled -  
1. Increasing CA by £20 a week from its current rate of £62.70 a week (2018).  
2. Increasing CA by £20 a week with a corresponding increase in the carer premium for 
Income Support/non- contributory ESA and Housing Benefit claimants. 
3. Increasing CA by £40/week. 
4. Increasing CA by £40/week with a corresponding increase in the carer premium for 
Income Support/non- contributory ESA and Housing Benefit claimants. 
5. An additional premium of £40/week for "heavy carers" (CA claimants who do 50 hours or 
more of caring per week as recorded in the FRS data). 
6. Widening eligibility for CA to include pensioners doing 35 hours or more of caring per 
week.  
Table 1 shows the distributional impact by decile of family equivalised disposable income. The fifth 
and sixth columns show the results for increasing the CA by £20 and £40 respectively with an 
additional corresponding increase in carer premiums for Income support (IS); non-contributory 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) and housing benefit (HB).  As explained earlier, the 
increase in carer premiums for income support is included alongside the increase in CA as a scenario 
where low-income families get the full benefit of the increase. Likewise, a corresponding increase in 
the ESA and HB is included alongside the proposed increase in CA because a lot of low income 
households who claim CA claim these benefits as well. At present the carer premium is meant to 
compensate claimants for the fact that CA is taken into account as income in the means test for 
IS/ESA. The last four columns show the average percentage change in weekly income by income 
decile for all households from the changes in the average weekly income base. As only a relatively 
                                                          
4
 https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/minimum-income-standard-britain-what-people-think.  
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small proportion of families receive CA the distributional impact of the reforms across the whole 
population of families is relatively small. For example, increasing CA by £20/week, with a 
corresponding increase in carer premiums for IS/ESA and HB, leads to a percentage gain of only 
0.41% of disposable income in the bottom decile. The largest percentage increase (0.87%) for the 
poorest decile is achieved by increasing CA by £40 a week with a corresponding increase in carer 
premiums for IS/ESA and HB. The final column shows the distributional impact of widening the policy 
in relation to CA eligibility. At present pensioners are not eligible to receive CA because of 
overlapping benefits rules which means they are not permitted to receive both CA and the state 
pension. In our proposed change that rule is abolished so that pensioners can receive CA on top of a 
state pension. The reason why it makes no difference for the first and second deciles is because 
there are no pensioners in that group and they thus cannot benefit from the new rule.  It is 
important to note however that as CA is counted as income for Pension Credit purposes PC 
claimants would not see any net benefit unless their PC payment (after means-testing) was lower 
than the level of CA. One way for the Scottish Government  to get around this would be to establish 
a new benefit, say for example, "Pensioners Carers Allowance" which would specifically not be 
counted as income in the Pension Credit calculations, and so wouldn't be subject to the PC means 
test. 
Table 1: Distributional Impact: Percentage change in income from changes in CA Income/Eligibility 
Table 2 shows the impact on household poverty rates for each of the six reform scenarios, using the 
Before Housing Costs relative income definition of poverty- i.e. below 60% of median equivalised 
household disposable income. This is the poverty rate for all Scottish households from the FRS rather 
than those with carers only. Tables 5 and 6, discussed later, feature only households which receive 
CA. In Table 2, as in Table 1, there is very little change at the ‘macro’ level with a fairly 
inconsequential drop in the overall poverty rate of between 0.01% and 0.19%.   
 
Table 2: Percentage Change in Poverty Rate (BHC relative Poverty Households) 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show the distributional results for the subsamples of CA claimants and ‘sandwich’ 
households, that is, those claiming both Carers Allowance and Child Benefit respectively. The 
distributional impact for this subgroup produces much bigger average gains, compared to average 
gains across income quintiles for the population as a whole, because the average is calculated over 
just those households who are claiming CA in the first place. The one exception to this relates to the 
proposed reform to widen eligibility to pensioners. As shown in both Tables 3 and 4, this scenario 
produces a zero impact. This is because the people who benefit are not in the initial sample of CA 
claimants but are instead a wider group to whom CA eligibility is being extended. 
Table 3 Distributional Impact for Carer’s Allowance Claimants Only: Percentage change in income 
from changes in CA Income/Eligibility 
As Table 3 shows, the distributional impact is greatest for the proposed increase of £40 a week plus, 
i.e. with the corresponding increase in carer premiums for IS; non-contributory ESA and HB. There is 
an average increase in income of nearly 10 percent for the poorest decile and about 7 percent for 
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the second and third deciles. As column 5 shows, even increasing the CA by £40 a week without any 
corresponding increases in supplementary benefits raises average income for the poorest decile by 
almost 8 percent. Aside from the noteworthy distributional impact, this proposed reform also 
suggests progressivity across the income deciles with the percentage change in income decreasing 
from almost 10 percent for the poorest decile to almost 3 percent for the richest decile.  
Table 4: Distributional Impact for “Sandwich” households: Percentage change in income from 
changes in CA Income/Eligibility 
Table 4 looks at the distributional impact for ‘Sandwich’ households, that is, households claiming 
both CA and child benefit. Again, the biggest impact in terms of percentage change in average 
income comes from increasing CA by £40 a week plus, i.e. with the corresponding increase in carer 
premiums for IS; non-contributory ESA and HB. Here the percentage increase is around 7 to 8 
percent for the two poorest deciles and between 5 and 7 percent for the next three deciles. Similarly 
to the subgroup of CA claimants only in Table 3, just increasing CA by £40 without any corresponding 
increases in supplementary benefits raises average income for the poorest decile of CA and CB 
claimants by over 4 percent. Again, as with CA claimants only (Table 3), the changes are consistently 
progressive throughout the deciles.  
Tables 5 and 6 show the changes in the numbers in poverty for the subsamples of CA claimants and 
’sandwich’ households claiming both CA and CB respectively. Focusing on the impact in terms of 
reduction in poverty for these subgroups produces much bigger average gains as compared to 
average gains across income quintiles for the population as a whole, because the average is 
calculated over only those households who are claiming CA (Table 2). The one exception to this 
relates to the proposed reform to widen eligibility to pensioners. As with the distributional impact 
(Tables 3 and 4) this produces a zero effect because the people who benefit are not in the initial 
sample of CA claimants, but instead are a wider group whom CA eligibility is being extended to in 
this micro simulation. One note of caution on the figures for the CA claimant group and the 
‘sandwich’ group is that the sample sizes are small in both cases and hence the confidence interval 
on the results is likely to be quite large.  
Table 5 focuses specifically on the changes to the numbers in poverty for the subgroup of CA 
claimants only rather than the changes in poverty rates for the population as a whole (Table 2).   
Table 5: Changes to Numbers in Poverty (CA claimants only) 
From a baseline of 30,583 CA households in poverty can be observed the decline in actual numbers, 
the change relative to the baseline, the overall poverty rate for this subgroup and the percentage 
change in the poverty as a result of each of the proposed reforms. Increasing the payment by £20 or 
£40 only reduces the numbers in poverty by between 2,744 and 3, 944 while increasing the 
payments with a corresponding increase in other benefits reduces the number of CA households in 
poverty by 4,109 and 7,853 respectively. The largest percentage change of 6.81 percent occurs on 
the implementation of increasing CA by £40 per week plus (i.e. with the corresponding increase in 
carer premiums for IS; non-contributory ESA and HB). 
Table 6 shows the changes to the numbers in poverty for the subgroup of CA and CB claimants. The 
baseline here is only 15,796 households, about half that of the CA claimant households (Table 5).  
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Table 6: Changes to Numbers in Poverty (CA and CB claimants) 
Increasing the payment by £20 or £40, with and without corresponding the increases in other 
benefits reduces the number of CA/CB households in poverty from between 1,264 to 3,539 with a 
corresponding change in the poverty rate relative to the baseline of between -2.27 and – 6.35 
percent.  
Table 7 shows the aggregate costings (£m per year) of implementing each policy for Scotland. It 
shows the costs both in £m per year and as a percentage increase in the baseline spending on CA. It 
is important to note that the costings are not simply the increased expenditure on CA but also take 
into account other fiscal impacts such as reduced expenditure on any other means-tested benefits 
and tax credits and increased income tax receipts. CA is treated as taxable income for Income Tax 
purposes. 
Table 7: Costings relative to Baseline (£m) of Changes  
In summary, what the microsimulation analysis illustrates is that both the distributional impact and 
the changes in the poverty rate of the reforms across the whole population of families (benefit 
units5) is relatively small. This is because only a relatively small proportion of families receive CA. 
However, when moving to assess the distributional impact only for those in receipt of CA and for 
those in receipt of both CA and Child Benefit much larger average gains are observed. Further, when 
the impact on the numbers in poverty, focusing specifically on those receiving CA and those in 
receipt of both CA and Child Benefit, is assessed we see substantial results.  
Specifically, the analysis above demonstrates the most significant result in terms of the distributional 
and poverty rate impact for CA and for sandwich (CA and CB) households comes from increasing the 
CA by £40 with a corresponding increase in carer premiums for IS; non-contributory ESA and HB. A 
reform that reduces the numbers of CA households in poverty by 8 percent, however, comes at a 
substantial price. As Table 7 illustrates the cost of this reform requires an increase in overall benefit 
spending of £108 million a year. This represents a 77 percent increase as percentage of baseline CA 
spending. In comparison introducing the increase of £20 plus reduces the numbers of CA households 
in poverty by about 4 percent requiring an increase in overall benefit spending of £51 million a year 
which represents a 36 percent increase in spending as percentage of baseline CA spending. These 
costings are very similar to the projections produced by the Scottish Parliament Information Centre 
in its modelling based on the new rate proposed for CA in line with JSA (SPICe, 2016: 29). In their 
analysis the proposed change would increase expenditure by £38m. Adopting the Scottish Green 
Party’s proposal to increase the weekly amount of CA to £93.15 while maintaining existing eligibility 
requirements would incur an increase of £107m. What this paper has achieved is to make clear the 
distributional impact of such spending. 
                                                          
5
. We use the term family rather than ‘benefit unit’ aware that ‘family’ is often taken as meaning adults plus 
children, whereas some CA claimants are in childless households. A benefit unit is an adult single person or 
couple plus any dependent children.   
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Conclusion 
Carers provide a crucial support function in society that has been woefully undervalued. Given that 
local authorities will struggle increasingly to provide adequate social care in context of an aging 
demographic, combined with cuts to health and social care spending, it is likely that informal care will 
rise. This in itself, if adequately resourced, may not be a bad outcome given the some of the 
arguments to prefer care provided by loved ones to ‘stranger care’ (Cantillon and Lynch, 2017). 
Whether or not adequate support is there to prevent those undertaking it from slipping into poverty 
and debt is more open to question, but also to corrective action. The Scottish Government have raised 
CA more or less in line with JSA via the mechanism of a supplementary lump-sum payment. However, 
bringing CA almost in line with JSA still does not offer carers an income that is sufficient financially or is 
a fair acknowledgement of their contribution to society. Westminster have also expressed their intent 
to reform support for carers to better recognise the contribution they make to society. However, such 
proposals have remained vague and indeed there have been reports that the Department of Work and 
Pension officials had been asked to look into the possibility of cutting CA and restricting eligibility (UK 
Parliament, 2016: 23).  
A key component of the Scottish independence campaign of 2014 was a vision of a fairer more 
progressive Scotland. The Scottish Government has stated its wish to radically depart from a social 
security system which has failed to recognise the ‘priceless’ contribution carers make to society.6 In 
order to promote carers’ rights and position in society, research is needed that provides evidence of 
the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of support to carers (Larkin and Milne, 2014: 33). The findings 
presented in this paper suggest that merely raising CA in line with JSA would see little real change to 
the levels of poverty among the poorest households providing care if there are not also attendant 
changes to overlapping benefits. Even uplifting the rate of CA by £40 a week would have a relatively 
low impact on the overall household poverty rate. More substantial inroads into the poverty rate 
would involve the £40 uplift ‘plus’ scenario which includes corresponding increases in premiums 
associated with IS, ESA and HB. The reason that both the distributional impact and the changes in the 
poverty rate of the reforms across the whole population is small is because only a relatively small 
proportion of families receive CA. However, the distributional impact of the proposed changes for 
those who are in receipt of CA and for those in receipt of both CA and CB show much higher average 
gains. In particular, the results indicated a significant impact on the numbers in poverty when the 
focus is solely on those receiving CA and those in receipt of both CA and Child Benefit.   
We suggest that the opportunities for social security changes should not be judged against macro 
distributional data alone but against the impact for the actual and potential recipients of well-targeted 
policies – the poverty suffered by segments of society providing informal care. Increasing the weekly 
amount of the payments that could be given in CA and widening the eligibility to receive it were 
modelled to assess the impact of some of the policy variations open to the Scottish Government to 
pursue in this newly devolved policy-making arena. While the reforms proposed to CA in Scotland do 
not alter the overall income inequality distribution they could make a substantial difference to the 
poverty rate for carers in poverty and thus to the lived experience of carers and those for whom they 
care. In honouring their pledge to improve support for carers, their quality of life and in beginning to 
                                                          
6
 As Nicola Sturgeon told the 2015 conference of the Scottish National Party (Sunday Post, 2015).  
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rectify an historical undervaluing of informal care, the Scottish Government might consider aiming the 
changes in CA at those most in need of support.  
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Table 1: Distributional Impact: Percentage change in income from changes in CA Income/Eligibility 
Source: Landman Economics: Microsimulation model (Scotland) 2018 
 
Table 2: Percentage Change in Poverty Rate (BHC relative Poverty Households) 
 Baseline Increase 
CA by 
£20 
Increase 
CA by 
£40 
Increase CA 
by £20 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits 
Increase CA 
by £40 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits 
£40/week 
premium 
for ‘heavy 
carers’ 
Widen CA 
eligibility 
(State 
Pension) 
Poverty 
Rate 
(adjusted) 
18.67% 18.63% 18.62 18.58% 18.48% 18.66% 18.67% 
Change 
Relative to 
baseline 
 -0.04% -0.05% -0.09% -0.19% -0.01% 0.00% 
Source: Landman Economics: Microsimulation model (Scotland) 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Distributional Impact for Carer’s Allowance Claimants Only: Percentage change in income 
from changes in CA Income/Eligibility 
Decile Average 
weekly Y 
(base)  
Increase 
CA by 
£20  
Increase 
CA by 
£40  
Increase CA by 
£20 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits 
Increase CA by 
£40 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits 
£40/week 
premium 
for “heavy 
carers” 
Widen CA 
eligibility 
(State 
Pension) 
1
st 
(Poorest) 
 £203.08 0.25 0.37 0.41 0.87 0.04 0.00 
2nd  £351.02 0.08 0.18 0.29 0.62 0.03 0.00 
3
rd
  £370.74 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.31 0.03 0.03 
4
th
  £427.63 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.22 0.02 0.16 
5
th
  £470.65 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.25 0.01 0.09 
6
th
  £566.65 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.13 
7
th
  £642.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.10 
8
th
  £745.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.09 
9
th
  £897.41 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
10th £1,448.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
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Decile Proportion 
of HHs in 
decile who 
are CA 
claimants 
Average 
weekly 
Y (base)  
 
£ 
Increase 
CA by 
£20  
Increase 
CA by 
£40  
Increase CA by 
£20 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits 
Increase CA by 
£40 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits 
£40/week 
premium 
for ‘heavy 
carers’ 
Widen 
CA 
eligibility 
(State 
Pension) 
1
st 
(Poorest) 
2.4% 402.47 5.17 7.63 4.52 9.65 0.73 0.00 
2
nd
 3.9% 480.00 1.54 3.38 3.27 7.10 0.48 0.00 
3
rd
 2.1% 528.52 1.25 2.51 3.23 6.95 0.98 0.00 
4
th
 1.8% 581.09 0.79 2.86 3.02 6.38 0.84 0.00 
5
th
 1.9% 528.49 1.66 4.05 2.79 6.35 0.61 0.00 
6
th
 1.9% 684.46 0.83 1.70 2.18 4.39 0.51 0.00 
7
th
 1.0% 687.47 2.36 4.59 2.36 4.59 0.54 0.00 
8
th
 0.5% 874.11 1.48 2.91 2.29 4.53 1.17 0.00 
9
th
 0.2% 1,295.54 1.37 2.74 1.37 2.74 1.38 0.00 
10
th
 0.3% 1,502.74 1.33 2.66 1.33 2.66 0.00 0.00 
Source: Landman Economics: Microsimulation model (Scotland) 2018 
 
Table 4: Distributional Impact for “Sandwich” households: Percentage change in income from 
changes in CA Income/Eligibility 
Decile Proportion 
of HH in 
decile who 
are CA 
claimants 
Average 
weekly 
Y (base)  
 
£ 
Increase 
CA by 
£20  
Increase 
CA by 
£40  
Increase CA by 
£20 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits 
Increase CA by 
£40 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits 
£40/week 
premium 
for ‘heavy 
carers’ 
Widen 
CA 
eligibility 
(State 
Pension) 
1
st 
(Poorest) 
 
1.2% 
 
532.97 
 
3.19 
 
4.14 
 
3.92 
 
7.92 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
2
nd
 2.0% 485.29 1.89 3.52 3.42 7.18 0.04 0.00 
3
rd
 0.9% 611.85 0.71 2.49 2.46 5.73 1.46 0.00 
4
th
 1.0% 648.14 1.15 2.79 2.38 5.29 0.00 0.00 
5
th
 1.0% 495.47 1.28 3.95 2.68 6.84 0.00 0.00 
6
th
 0.9% 655.35 0.75 1.57 3.10 6.27 0.00 0.00 
7
th
 0.6% 719.93 2.02 4.03 2.02 4.03 0.00 0.00 
8
th
 0.3% 820.97 1.66 3.23 2.44 4.79 0.00 0.00 
9
th
 0.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
10
th
 0.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Source: Landman Economics: Microsimulation model (Scotland) 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Changes to Numbers in Poverty (CA claimants only) 
 18 
 
 Baseline Increase 
CA by 
£20 
Increase 
CA by 
£40 
Increase CA 
by £20 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits 
Increase CA 
by £40 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits 
£40/week 
premium 
for ‘heavy 
carers’ 
Widen CA 
eligibility 
(State 
Pension) 
Numbers 30,583 27,839 26,639 26,474 22,730 29,779 30,583 
Change 
(relative 
to 
baseline) 
 -2,744 -3,944 -4,109 -7,853 -804 0 
Poverty 
Rate 
26.51% 24.13% 23.09% 22.95% 19.70% 25.81% 26.51% 
Change 
(relative 
to 
baseline) 
 -2.38% -3.42% -3.56% -6.81% -0.70% 0 
Source: Landman Economics: Microsimulation model (Scotland) 2018 
 
 
Table 6: Changes to Numbers in Poverty (CA and CB claimants) 
 Baseline Increase 
CA by 
£20  
Increase 
CA by 
£40 
Increase CA 
by £20 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits  
Increase CA 
by £40 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits 
£40/week 
premium 
for ‘heavy 
carers’ 
Widen CA 
eligibility 
(State 
Pension) 
Numbers 15,796 14,532 14,532 13,862 12,257 15,796 15,796 
Change 
(relative to 
baseline) 
 -1,264 -1,264 -1,934 -3,539 0 0 
Poverty 
Rate 
28.32% 26.06% 26.06% 24.85% 21.98% 28.32% 28.32% 
Change 
(relative to 
baseline) 
 -2.27% -2.27% -3.47% -6.35% 0 0 
Source: Landman Economics: Microsimulation model (Scotland) 2018 
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Table 7: Costings relative to Baseline (£m) of Changes  
Baseline 
Numbers 
15,796 
Rate 28.32% 
Increase 
CA by 
£20 
Increase 
CA by 
£40 
Increase CA 
by £20 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits 
Increase CA 
by £40 And 
Corresponding 
Changes to 
other Benefits  
£40/week 
premium 
for ‘heavy 
carers’ 
Widen CA 
eligibility 
(State 
Pension) 
Increase in 
overall benefit 
spending 
(£m per year) 
22 40 51 108 6 66 
Increase in 
spending as % 
of baseline CA 
spending 
16% 29% 36% 77% 4% 47% 
Source: Landman Economics: Microsimulation model (Scotland) 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
